ACTA SLAVICA IAPONICA

Volume 16 (1998)

The Regional Problem and the Break-Up of the State:
The Case of Yugoslavia
*
Časlav Ocić

The Nature and the Scope of the Regional Problem
Regional Policies and Changes in the Institutional Framework
Regional Development Levels: Grouping of Regions
Structural Change: Shift-Share Analysis
Efficiency: Shift-Share Analysis
Interregional Relations: Autarky
Some Other Results of the Regions' Development
Regional Development Costs: Ratios of Investment
Interregional Income (Re)distribution
(D)evolution
Regional Convergence or Divergence?
Equality: The Failure of the Positive Discrimination Model
"The National Question" and Nationalism
Separatism: Economic and Political
Federalism
A Long Journey from Utopia to Dystopia
Selected Bibliography
Data Sources & Documents
Notes
Appendix  (1)  (2)

Interregional Income (Re)distribution
Undoubtedly, this process was also made possible by the mechanisms of interregional distribution and the redistribution of income. Their effects are aggregately shown and dimensioned relative to the key economic aggregate -the GNP. In this way, in addition to the structure, the total scope of interregional financial relations was also identified. Both in real and in nominal terms, only Kosovo-Metohia and Montenegro had a favourable balance. Other units (including the federation) showed a deficit. A deficit also occurred in the sum of payments and receipts prescribed by federal regulations. This widespread deficit financing, however, did not place all the republics and provinces in the same relative position. Some of the absolute losers turned out to be relative winners. These include Bosnia-Herzegovina (whose receipts stipulated by federal regulations, in relative terms, were one and a half times higher than payments) and Macedonia. The biggest absolute and relative losers were central Serbia and Vojvodina, followed by Croatia and Slovenia.
Total payments prescribed by federal regulations compared to GNP show (with the exception of Kosovo-Metohia and Slovenia) a relative regional uniformity -from an average of 10% at the beginning to 9% at the end of the observed period. On the other hand, total receipts prescribed by federal regulations relative to GNP vary, from between 1% and 2% in Vojvodina, to between 39.47% and 47.84% in Kosovo-Metohia. This reveals a considerable interregional redistributive effect. It is manifested either as a positive or negative balance of a republic or province and is then calculated as a percentage of GNP. Kosovo-Metohia had the largest inflow of federally prescribed funds, while Slovenia and central Serbia had the largest relative outflow. The country's total deficit, as that of most republics and provinces, tended to decline slightly up to 1987, but in 1988 it was again on the increase.
By using constant prices, the payments and receipts of republics and provinces under federal regulations have been aggregated for the 1981-1988 period. Over these eight years the largest outflow in absolute terms occurred in central Serbia (211,811 million dinars in 1980 prices), while the largest inflow was that into Kosovo-Metohia (112,501 million dinars). If we compare regional shares in payments and receipts of federal prescribed funds, Kosovo-Metohia is the biggest relative winner as well -its receipts are 12.14 times higher than its payments. Vojvodina is the biggest relative loser -its receipts account for only 37% of its payments.
Since this highly complicated and more importantly, conflict-causing process of "robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul"produced more losers than winners, the final effect of this confused mixture of relationships is clear before all in comparison to the objectives that inspired their establishment.12