

Summary

Analysis of the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict off the Paracel Islands in 2014

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China's survey of mineral resources in the sea surrounding the Paracel Islands from May to July 2014 became the center of public attention. China sent the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981, its most up-to-date facility. The Vietnamese government, the U.S. government, and the Japanese government denounced China's unilateral action. It was also opposed by the Vietnamese government's ships and fishery boats in the sea area surrounding the Paracel Islands. The Chinese government dispatched China Coast Guard (CCG) patrol vessels, transportation ships, and fishery boats to defend the oil rig, and the survey ended suddenly in July, one month earlier than originally scheduled.

This article is composed of seven parts. The first part provides an introduction to the incident. The second part reviews the legal aspects of the Sino-Vietnamese dispute over the Paracel Islands, and the implied interpretation of China's U-shaped line in the South China Sea. The third part provides general information on China's motivation and the decision-making procedures behind this survey. The author attaches importance to the Chinese leader's ambition to be a maritime power, as not only Hu Jintao but also Xi Jinping have mentioned this. The fourth part provides information on the fragmented nature of China's bureaucracy. Some leaders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the ministry of foreign affairs were less enthusiastic about the survey.

The fifth part provides information on the responses of the Vietnamese government and nation, neighboring ASEAN countries, and external powers like the United States, Japan, and India. Step-by-step diplomatic pressure from the U.S. President and senators, and Vietnam's tough response to China, seemed to be effective against China's offensive posture. Chinese communist party leaders were shocked to learn that the Vietnamese communist party secretary-general, Nguyen Phu Trong, had called for preparation for war against China.

The sixth part provides details on the sudden completion of the Chinese rig's operation, and an analysis of the reasons behind China's withdrawal of the oil rig.

The seventh part offers concluding remarks, providing some aspects and lessons for Vietnam and China. Drawing from Vietnam's experience, it also offers some lessons for Japan regarding

the Senkaku Islands. The writer highlights the significance of the hot-line between China and Vietnam, and concludes that a future hot-line between Japan and China is a necessary measure, but is not enough to prevent a Chinese offensive. We, the Japanese, require a more active and feasible deterrent capability through our own means, and through the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

Negotiating Ethno-Religious Boundaries and Multidimensional Connectedness among Yunnanese Muslims in the Thai-Myanmar Borderland

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This paper describes the dynamics and survival strategies employed to maintain ethno-religious boundaries while focusing on the relationships among ethnic groups, particularly of the Yunnanese Muslims who migrated from China, in the Thai-Myanmar borderland, a region which has experienced the repeated ebb and flow of numerous ethnic groups. From the late 19th century to the first half of the 20th century, Yunnanese Muslims were the main group in the Thai-Myanmar borderlands responsible for interregional trade and formed commercial cooperative communities. However, around the middle of the 20th century, many Yunnanese Muslims crossed over the border from Myanmar to Thailand as a result of the civil war and establishment of the new government in China. Although the Yunnanese Muslims had fled China to seek peace, they were thrust in the midst of a civil war and cold war conflict waged by the Chinese Nationalist Party, which consisted primarily of Han Chinese, and found themselves under a military political rule in which their ethnic identity was largely repudiated. Meanwhile, the host country, Thailand, which was facing the threat of the cold war and communist powers, intensified its control of the border region and the ethnic minorities residing there, including the Yunnanese Muslims. Furthermore, as a result of efforts by the Thai government to promote assimilation under secular authority and to bring religions under governmental control, the Yunnanese Muslims were confronted with challenges to their religious identity. Even under such circumstances, the Yunnanese Muslims continued to strengthen networks based on principles rooted in their Chineseness and, at the same time, to exercise their Islamness by connecting with other South Asian Muslims across ethnic boundaries. As a result, they managed

to maintain their religious boundaries as Muslims while both developing ethnic networks and preserving their distinctive culture. Thanks to their skill in negotiating ethno-religious boundaries, the Yunnanese Muslims have been able to cross over existing ethnic boundaries and to increase their religious and ethnic presence in a foreign country. The Yunnanese Muslims represent an example of migrants who have not unilaterally assimilated into the host society but have instead developed a survival strategy based on the establishment of multidimensional connections and the making of autonomous choices while navigating various international and inter-ethnic relationships.

A Study on the Legend of Nichiji's Mission in Karafuto: Characters and Social Influences of the 'Hokushin [Northern Advance]' Theories in the Empire of Japan (1)

ITANI Hiroshi

Nichiji was one of the six main pupils of Nichiren in the thirteenth century. In 1295, 13 years after his master Nichiren's death, Nichiji took a missionary journey to somewhere, and was never heard of again. However, there was a legend within the Nichiren sect for generations after that Nichiji had reached Yuan Dynasty China via Hokkaido, Karafuto (Sakhalin), and the delta area of the Amur, and that he had proselytized there.

After the Russo-Japan War, some modern Nichiren believers (Takanabe Nitto and members of his group) tried to demonstrate and verify the legend of Nichiji in order to use it as historical evidence for Pan-Asianism. By the 1920s, they had visited and investigated all the places along the imaginary route supposedly taken by Nichiji. As a result, they found several of Nichiji's 'holy relics' and monuments, while publishing articles to disseminate Nichiji's attainment. Through their stories, Nichiji became not only one of the earliest missionaries abroad, but also a symbol of Japan's cultural conquest of Northeast Asia. However, most historians today dismiss the authenticity of this legend because all of the evidence regarding Nichiji could have been fabricated by these discoverers or followers of modern Nichiren.

Based on the above legend, this paper makes the following two points about 'Hokushin [Northern Advance]' theories in the Empire of Japan.

(1) 'Hokushin' theories should be categorized into three groups in view of the transition visible

in Japan's strategy. Group A: theories and stories rooted in Japan's traditional policy of defense, named 'hokumon-no-sayaku [key and chains of the northern gate]', against Russia's advance south. Group B: 'Hokushin' theories as the alternative strategy to Japan's 'Nanshin [Southern Advance]' after the Russo-Japan War. Group C: theories of expansion into Russian territory after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

(2) Stories about Nichiji's mission circulated differently in the continental colonies (China, Mongolia, and Korea) and northern areas (Karafuto and Hokkaido). In the continental colonies, the Nichiji legend didn't spread beyond believers of the Nichiren sect. In Karafuto, on the contrary, islanders in 1920s and 1930s hoped a 'new history', including the Nichiji legend, would support their own historical legitimacy (as all were post-1905 newcomers). Therefore, the legend of Nichiji was gradually accepted as a 'true and new history' of their own. Two monuments were important in changing legend into historical fact. 1) A large stone in Ako (a small village on the western coast of Karafuto) engraved with the holy mantra 'Namu-myoho-rengekyo,' supposedly by Nichiji, was protected as historical heritage although it lacked credibility. 2) The statue of Nichiji erected in Toyohara in August 1930 by believers of the Nichiren sect in Karafuto.

In conclusion, this paper indicates that 'Hokushin' theories are useful as a key concept for the modern history of Imperial Japan and its relations with Northeast Asia.

Geopolitics in Turkey: Between State Theory and Critical Theory

IMAI Kohei

This paper examines the aggressive acceptance of geopolitics in Turkish academism. In light of its specific geographical situation, geopolitics has been often used as a means of explaining Turkey's diplomatic behavior. Consequently, Turkish International Relations (IR) scholars have applied and developed concepts of geopolitics. This trend has been strong since the early 2000s and there are two reasons for this.

First of all, non-Western IR has recently emerged as one of the hottest topics in IR. Several scholars, especially from non-Western countries, have attempted to show original concepts, specific methods of the acceptance process, and advanced dimensions of IR in their own countries. Scholars

in Turkey are no exception. For Turkey, geopolitics is a concept that represents originality.

Secondly, Ahmet Davutoğlu, an expert in IR, has applied his thoughts on geopolitics to actual foreign policy. In 2001, he published *Strategic Depth*, which suggested, from the perspectives of geopolitics and history, the ideal diplomacy routes Turkey should pursue. After winning the election on November 2002, the Justice and Development Party promoted Davutoğlu to a Foreign Policy Advisor. He served as Foreign Policy Advisor from 2002 to 2009 and also served as Foreign Minister from 2009 to 2014.

The acceptance of geopolitics in Turkey is classified into two theories. The first theory is “state theory,” and explains the characteristics of Turkey’s geopolitics. This paper analyzes three concepts of state: “insulator state,” “liminal state,” and “cusp state.” According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, an “insulator state” is defined as a state that is positioned between two different regions with regard to security, “but not strong enough to unify its two worlds into one.” A “liminal state” is defined as a state that is suffering from mismatches between its identity and geopolitical position. For example, Australia has a European identity but is positioned in an Asian/Pacific region. Turkey is also categorized as a “liminal state” because of its multiple identities. Generally, the “liminal state” concept connotes a negative meaning. The “cusp state” concept literally focuses on regional cusp countries such as Turkey. In contrast to “liminal state,” a “cusp state” enjoys a positive geopolitical position. According to Philip Robins, the particularities of the diplomatic behavior of “cusp states” include the promotion of linkages between different regions, playing the role of a mediator, and playing a constructive role in multilateral diplomacy.

The second theory concerning the acceptance of geopolitics in Turkish academism is critical geopolitics. According to John Agnew, critical geopolitics investigates and clarifies the geographical assumptions and designations that are involved in the creation of world politics. Gearóid Ó Tuathail (Gerard Toal) classifies critical geopolitics into four parts: 1) formal or “wise-man” geopolitics, which is the geopolitics interpreted by decision makers or intellectuals; 2) practical geopolitics, which is a diplomatic practice based on particular geopolitical situations concerning topics such as formal geopolitics; 3) mass geopolitics, which is popular in specific geopolitical thinking; 4) structural geopolitics, which concerns the structural changes of international systems and how they affect formal and practical geopolitics.

Turkish scholars like Pınar Bilgin, Murat Yeşiltaş, and Meliha Altunışık use formal and practical geopolitics to explain Turkish foreign policy. However, from the perspective of critical geopolitics their analyses remain incomplete. Concerning formal geopolitical analysis, there are three weaknesses: 1) their study of the intellectuals and decision makers who place importance on geopolitics are limited, 2) they downgrade the concept of “Neo-Ottomanism,” which was advocated

by Turgut Özal in the early 1990s, and 3) Yeşiltaş and Altunışık explain the diplomacy of Davutoğlu in a positive manner; their explanation is not critical analysis but problem-solving analysis. There are also three problems in relation to practical geopolitical analysis: The first is the validity of using geopolitical analysis for explanations. For example, “Sever Syndrome” or threat perception from the USSR is more suitable for Turkish foreign policy analysis. They also disregard the impact of the end of the Cold War, which is a second problem; the end of the Cold War triggered a dramatic change in Turkish foreign policy. This phenomenon diminished the threat of the USSR and opened new diplomatic opportunities in Central Asia, the Balkan Peninsula, and the South Caucasus. The third problem is the stagnation of Davutoğlu’s diplomacy toward the Middle East, as highlighted by the Syrian Crisis.

This paper discusses two theories of aggressive acceptance of geopolitics in academism in Turkey. As mentioned above, the acceptance and the application of geopolitics in Turkey is still unfinished. At the very least, expanding the “cusp state” concept in state theory and critical geopolitical analysis is essential for developing a Turkey-specific IR.

Survey of Former Japanese Residents and Their Descendants on the Northern Territories Issue

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Research conducted in the past 10 years on the Northern Territories Issue (the Kuril Islands dispute), a territorial problem between Japan and Russia, has not paid sufficient attention to the views of former Japanese residents and their descendants. Consequently, my research aims to fill this gap by gathering data from former Japanese residents and their descendants regarding the Northern Territories. Data was collected in September 2014 through a questionnaire survey conducted of 49 ex-islanders, with the collaboration of Chishima Renmei in Sapporo and Nemuro.

The results showed that the majority of ex-islanders and descendants (84%) think that the entirety of the disputed territory (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, Habomai) are very important for them. Only 14% supported the Japanese government’s policy against Russia. 65% were opposed to it. Also, a majority (74%) of ex-islanders did not support Japan’s policy towards the Northern Territories.

Only 25% hopes that a solution to the territorial issue is possible. 24% believes that making the

most of the trust between the leaders of Japan and Russia could ensure an effective resolution of the dispute. And they see this as a key to a peace treaty between the two countries.

Only 39% supported the theory of returning the four islands to Japan. 47% did not support this theory. Less than 50% answered that they are ready to return to live on the islands making up the Northern Territories. A majority (78%) of these said that they are ready to live together with Russian residents.

These findings indicate that at the present time it is really difficult to solve this problem. There are differences between the positions of the Japanese government and ex-residents on the territorial dispute. It seems that the Japanese ex-residents' position on the issue is more realistic and clear than the government's. It can be concluded that there is no necessity of continuing to argue for the return of all four islands to Japan.

