

## Summary

### **Borderless Space: Discovering the Borodino Islands**

KIMURA Takashi

There are two coral islands 360km east of the main island of Okinawa in the Pacific Ocean. They are the Northern and Southern Daito Islands. In August 1820, the Russian naval captain Z. I. Ponafidin discovered these islands, and he named them the Borodino Islands after the name of his ship. The existence of both islands became known worldwide through an atlas created by the Russian Naval Ministry Cartography Agency. Almost 30 years were to pass, however, before anybody visited the islands using these sea charts. This was at a time when American and Imperial Russian envoy ships arose, visiting Japan to seek amity and trade with the closed country of Japan. Ships from both countries saw an opportunity to visit the islands to verify their existence during a period of difficult negotiations. The crew of the Russian “Vostok” came ashore and even went so far as to take plant samples home with them.

The objective of this paper, however, does not stop at reexamining the mere facts. This paper dares to take this historical fact and to thoroughly read the primary sources to establish evidence that today’s concept of borders is in no way universal or unchanging, and samples the “common knowledge” of people from that time.

Following the introduction, this paper comprises Chapter 1 “The Russian-American Company and Global Circumnavigation by Russian Ships,” Chapter 2 “The Discovery of New Islands by Captain Ponafidin of the Borodino,” Chapter 3 “Two Atlases that Reflected the New Information of the Pacific Ocean,” Chapter 4 “Putiatin and Perry, Enchanted by the Borodino Islands,” and a conclusion. First, I examined in great detail the archive sources written by Ponafidin, the discoverer himself, and analyzed his actions and judgments from a historical-cultural standpoint. Next, drawing on primary sources, I revealed the process through which Ponafidin’s reports about the discovery of the new islands were recognized as fact and included in the sea charts. Based on this, I then performed a similar historical-cultural analysis on the attitudes adopted unconsciously with regard to “borderless space” by the people of the time by understanding the mentality of the people involved in the work. Further, I also considered the reasons why Commodore Matthew C. Perry, who came to Japan as leader of a group of

American envoys, and Russian plenipotentiary Evfimii V. Putiatin, who signed the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and Russia (the Treaty of Shimoda) and noteworthy drew the first Russo-Japanese border, both expressed uncommon interest in the Borodino Islands, and took the specific actions of surveying and landing despite the difficulties. The paper concludes by pointing out that a “period of sickness” came in which various struggles were repeated due to the start of the common modern concept of “borders” between Japan and Russia.

## **Shumushu Island in August 1945**

ITANI Hiroshi

Shumushu Island is the northernmost island of the Kuril Islands (Chishima in Japanese), and was therefore the former border between Russia and Japan (1875-1945). However, in the early hours of 18 August 1945, the Soviet Army suddenly carried out an assault there, resulting in a grave battle between Soviet troops and the 91st Division of the Imperial Japanese Army. As a result, more than 1,500 soldiers had died, and furthermore, most of the surviving soldiers were detained in Siberia after the battle.

Based on original documents in both Japanese and Russian, this paper mainly describes the sequence of events that led to the outbreak of this battle and the eventual ceasefire.

The assault operation of the Soviet Army was planned and executed in order to take advantage of the defeat (surrender) of Japan using only current military strength of the Kamchatka Defense Troops (about 9,000 soldiers). The aim of the operation was to seize three of the Northern Kuril Islands. The Soviet troops decided to assault Shumushu Island first, not considering the possibility of taking possession without bloodshed.

During the daytime of 17 August, the Japanese troops of the 91st Division were intending not to put up resistance. But, just before the beginning of the Soviet attack, the headquarters of the 91st Division changed plans and ordered a counterattack. It was possible that Kiichiro Higuchi, the commander of the 5th Area Army, which controlled the northern areas of Japan, changed the order.

As they believed Japan and the Allied powers had already agreed a ceasefire by the time, the Japanese Army of the Northern Kuril Islands was ordered to cease hostilities at 16:00 on 18

August. However, the Imperial headquarters of Japan had decided on this time unilaterally.

The 91st Division fought off the Soviet attack until 16:00, and stopped fighting once the time limit was exceeded. However, the Soviet troops had no knowledge of this. Therefore, they continued the landing operation after the Japanese time limit and succeeded to take possession of two of the most important highlands on the island. It could be argued that the time limit imposed by the Imperial Headquarters of Japan was the main reason for the defeat of the 91st Division.

On the evening of 19 August, the first meeting for a ceasefire was held. Although the Japanese representatives agreed to the surrender that the Soviet troops instituted, Fusaki Tsutsumi, the commander of the 91st Division, rejected the surrender agreement after the meeting. His refusal of the surrender was directed by the headquarters of the 5th Area Army. The area army believed that the Soviet's "thoughtless" and "illegal" attack was the result of an arbitrary decision by Kamchatka's troops, and tried to have the attack halted through the order of Marshal Vasilevskii, the commander of the Far Eastern Soviet Army.

On 19 August, Marshal Vasilevskii met the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria to discuss a ceasefire and offered an expression of regret about the war situation in the Kuril Islands (and Sakhalin). The Kwantung Army communicated Vasilevskii's "heartaches" about the ceasefire to the 5th Area Army. But, the area army's staff misunderstood the meaning of his "heartaches." They believed that he was also anxious about the illegal nature of the attacks by the Kamchatka and Sakhalin troops. As a result, the ceasefire between the Soviet Union and Japan was delayed until the 5th Army cleared up their own misunderstandings.

Historical accounts of the war in the Russian language report that the Kamchatka troops attacked again on 20 August and defeated the Japanese troops. However, there is no evidence in Japanese historical accounts that a full scale attack occurred. In fact, the battle came to an end on 18 August.

This paper highlights the area army's participation in Japanese counterattacks and the delay of the ceasefire agreements. Also it points out that (official) Japanese historical accounts of the war concealed such participation entirely. The author supposes that the reason for the concealment was to defend Commander Higuchi from being designated a war criminal by the Soviet Union.

## **The Representation of the Volga in the Nineteenth Century Russian Literature: with Special Attention to Apollon Grigor'ev's "Upward the Volga"**

MOCHIZUKI Tetsuo

Through the history of literary representation of the Volga we can trace a genealogy of a fixed image "the Volga as a border." In the geopolitical sense the Volga is really an inland border, which divides (and unites) the European and Asiatic parts of the great empire. At the same time it is a border zone, where various ethnicities, cultures and confessional groups (including Muslims, Buddhists, Old believers, Protestants) have confronted and coexisted with each other. Usually the right bank and left bank of the river represent quite different worlds in terms of landscape, lifestyles and occupations of the inhabitants. To go across the Volga as well as to go down (or up) the river is a trans-cultural or trans-historical experience, which will influence one's own cultural identity.

Our paper aims at characterizing the specific features of the literary representation of "the Volga as a border" in the mid-nineteenth century. The main subject of our examination is Apollon Grigor'ev's poem "Upward the Volga" (1862), in which the poet, critic and theorist of the *pochvennichestvo* (native soil conservatism) describes a farewell to his last love (an ex-prostitute of St. Petersburg) against the background of his own sentimental journey to and from Orenburg, the Empire's forward base in Central Asia.

The major topics of our discussion are as follows:

- 1) How the river reflects various aspects of the poet's last love (instable, impulsive, irrational, sacred, vulgar, pure, immoral, severe, instinctive, fateful, unrestrained moments).
- 2) How the river represents the geographic-spatial border between Europe and Asia, civilization and wildness and so on.
- 3) How the river represents the mental-psychological border between spirit and body, pure love and carnal desires, commitment and neglect, seriousness and self-indulgence, soberness and drunkenness, and so on.
- 4) How the poet fails to go across the border in the direction of civilization and sober life, and how he, after all, remains on the borderland, in-between these opposing worlds.

5) How, in total, Grigor'ev's Volga represents Russia itself by its intermediate socio-cultural location between Europe and Asia.

The article also briefly sketches the functional change in the Volga's image in Russian literature from the odic genre in the eighteenth century through to the romantic-realist genres of the mid-nineteenth century. This is done by way of comparison between Nikolai Karamzin's "The Volga" (1793) and Nikolai Nekrasov's "On the Volga" (1860).

## **Denmark and the Issue of Sovereignty over the Arctic: about Diplomatic Leadership Based on "Geographic Neutrality"**

TAKAHASHI Minori

In recent years the Arctic Ocean has turned into a place of international contention. At the root of this struggle for interests lie attempts to obtain sovereignty rights over its underground mineral resources which are said to amount up to 22% of all undiscovered subterranean resources in the world, as well as the Northwest Passage and the Northwest Sea Route, which possess great commercial potential. The sovereignty problem is based on the following question: To which countries does the topographically complex continental shelf in this maritime area belong? The countries that are in geographical proximity to the Arctic Ocean are Russia, Canada, Norway, the U.S., and Denmark's self-governing territory of Greenland. The opinions of these countries differ in terms of what legal framework to apply and how to deal with the issue of jurisdiction over the continental shelf.

Especially noteworthy is the diplomatic leadership of Denmark, which is one of the interested parties in the Arctic dispute. As the issue of sovereignty over the Arctic began to capture the attention of not only the government but also the people, Denmark took a step towards solving this problem by exercising its leadership through organizing the Arctic Ocean Conference (Polarhavskonference) in May 2008, which was attended by the five coastal states and areas. Prior to this conference, Denmark also initiated the "Greenland Dialogue" (Grønlandsdialogen), which is a series of informal cabinet-level talks that have been held once a year since 2005 in different parts of the world, on the consequences of climate change. The goal of the talks is to protect the Arctic Ocean environment and the livelihood of the people in the region from the effects of climate change.

This dialogue is regarded as a cornerstone of Danish “climate diplomacy” (klimadiplomati).

Through the Arctic Ocean Conference and the Greenland Dialogue, Denmark formulated the Ilulissat Declaration (Ilulissat-erklæringen), which serves as a guideline for achieving a solution to the dispute over the Arctic. This series of actions has become known as the Ilulissat Initiative (Ilulissat Initiative). The diplomatic leadership displayed by Denmark is influencing, to a great extent, the establishment of order in the Arctic maritime area, where relations regarding sovereignty rights are unclear.

Why then was Denmark able to assume a leadership role? In other words, why has Denmark’s interest in the Arctic, exhibited in the realization of the Greenland Dialogue, the organization of the Arctic Ocean Conference, and the resulting Ilulissat Declaration, been displayed in the form of diplomatic leadership, and has even borne certain fruits? In order to answer this question, this paper uses the term “geographic neutrality” to describe the unique positionality of Denmark (Danmarks forhandlingsposition), in that it is the only actor that is not itself in geographic proximity to the Arctic Ocean.

The term “geographic neutrality” is, therefore, used here to mean that Denmark itself is the only country that is not a coastal state (grænsestat), i.e. the only actor that is not in close geographical proximity to the Arctic Ocean. Thanks to this, Denmark is able to be involved in the Arctic issue from a position that is slightly more detached in comparison with the nations that are in close geographical proximity to the Arctic Ocean and are literally coastal states. Needless to say, this is due to the fact that Denmark’s interest in the region springs from its possession of Greenland, and it is through this territory that Denmark is an interested party in the dispute and yet is able to exercise its influence from a slightly detached position.

Therefore, the word “neutrality” in the term “geographic neutrality” is not used here in the literal sense of “neutrality as a diplomatic stance based on maintaining neutral policies.” As Denmark obviously possesses the right of a party involved, it is not, strictly speaking, in a neutral position. The expression “neutrality” here refers to the neutrality that stems from the fact that Greenland, a coastal area of the Arctic Ocean, is Denmark’s self-governing territory and that Denmark is the only actor that is geographically distant from the Arctic Ocean, or in other words, does not itself possess geographical proximity to it. Denmark, while having a strong interest in the sovereignty issue surrounding the Arctic, is on the one hand exercising sovereignty over Greenland and, on the other, exhibiting diplomatic leadership by effectively using “geographic neutrality” derived from its geographically distant location/ non-proximity, and by decisively emphasising its position as an outsider.

As demonstrated by the organization of the Arctic Ocean Conference, the Ilulissat Declaration,

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and the Greenland Dialogue, Denmark is today exercising effective leadership supported by its “geographic neutrality” and aimed at achieving a peaceful resolution to the problem of the authority who draws the borders in the Arctic Ocean, the main cause of the dispute in this maritime area. This paper poses the question: What strategies can Denmark use to address the sovereignty dispute over the Arctic? In answering this question, the paper sheds light on the huge impact Denmark’s commitment to the Arctic issue has had on the structure of the confrontation over borders in the Arctic maritime area, and by examining Denmark’s leadership in relation to the Arctic dispute, focuses attention on the role of the “leading actor behind the scenes” that a “small country” like Denmark plays in the sovereignty dispute over the Arctic, without resorting to power games such as those played by the U.S. and Russia.

## **The Post 9/11 Canada-U.S. Border, a New Border? a Canadian Perspective**

Emmanuel BRUNET-JAILLY

Canada and the United States form a highly integrated economic region as evidenced by the fact that, since the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, economic integration has progressed faster than economic growth. In the 1990s, scholarly arguments suggested that the primary characteristic of the Canadian-U.S. border, borderlands and border urban regions was that it provided an environment facilitating the seamless flow of goods and capital; that it was a border increasingly transparent to trade. But since 9/11 it seems that border has hardened, and some have argued that securitization has had a huge impact on trade and is now seeping through and influencing all policy arenas that are concerned with and establish borderland policies. This paper is a review of these questions and presents current evidence that challenge the perception that the Canada-U.S. border in 2011 has hardened.

Indeed, following 9/11 both Canada and the U.S. have engaged in discussions over their friendship and the nature of their relations; economic integration and interdependence was at the forefront of those debates. In the U.S. most discussions have been focused on the nature of security on their northern border, while in Canada issues of economic integration also raise questions of sovereignty. While these discussions are necessary and ongoing, they do guide the type of policy

answers implemented by the U.S. and Canada, which are found to be in-line with what they have successfully implemented for well over a century. These are functionally focused policies that address narrowly defined issues, and are developed and implemented with limited government-like institutions of coordination. Indeed, when security issues are at stake the traditional North American community is solely constituted by Canada and the United States, and the exemplary institutional model is NORAD. It is focused on and limited to air security, and seems to be the model for the current border security system. Yet these organizational changes also necessitated budget increases, which in turn impacted the funding structure of those policies; Federal agencies on both sides of the border share the cost of security measures with provinces/states and local governments.

All in all, prior to 9/11 the border was not as seamless a border as was generally assumed but on the U.S. side it was understaffed, and overburdened by increasing trade activities. Post 9/11, and, before the signature of the Smart Border Agreement, the border stopped functioning for a few weeks. Once the Smart Border Agreement was implemented the border became very efficient, while trade remained stable or dropped, and, in particular during the 2008 economic crisis, economic integration increased and the cost of border crossings decreased significantly. In other words, post 9/11 border security policies became much more effective, and in fact, reduced freight cost across the boundary line.

In the end, these border security policies are typical of the specific and functionally focused approaches found in all agreements between Canada and the United States since the beginning of the last century, where function does not spill over into overlapping policy arenas. These state policies that are steeped in sovereignty issues and where the fundamental principles established by Westphalia are not in question. Security policies are thus visible and target specific functions necessary to trade. Indeed, Canada-U.S. agreements are focused on tackling security matters from the narrower perspective of potential terrorist threats, and where security is not broadly understood as potentially multi-sectoral but instead as primarily associated with criminal activities. These are policies that need political visibility but whose effectiveness is continuously in question. The recent Washington Agreement will not change these fundamental assumptions even if it is premised on the creation and implementation of a secured perimeter around Canada and the U.S.



## **Between Debordering and Rebordering Europe: Cross-Border Cooperation in the Øresund Region or the Danish-Swedish Border Region**

Carsten YNDIGEGN

The paper analyses the cooperation between authorities, public institutions and private companies in the Swedish and Danish part of the Øresund region, and it shows how cross-border cooperation is an example of the political intention of debordering Europe.

The Øresund region comprises the eastern part of Denmark and the south-western part of Sweden, two countries in Scandinavia in the northern part of Europe. The region got its name from the narrow body of water, the Øresund, a sound that divides the two countries. Major cities in the region include the Danish capital, Copenhagen, and the third largest Swedish city, Malmö.

The paper establishes a theoretical framework for understanding the aims of cross-border cooperation. European history is the history of bordering through warfare. Bordering processes have shown their negative consequences throughout history, but since the formation of the European Communities in 1957, a debordering of Europe has been high on the agenda. The EU has made it possible to settle, work and study in other EU countries, and the Schengen agreement led to the removal of visual border control. Through exchange programs and extensive cross-border cooperation along all internal EU borders, citizens participate in removing mental borders as well.

Cross-border cooperation has gradually developed in Europe. The first Euroregion was founded in 1958 as a Dutch-German initiative. Since 1989, the EU has funded the Interreg programmes. Currently, Interreg IVA has a total budget of 7.8 billion Euros (2006 prices).

This paper describes how a long-term vision to integrate the Øresund region became possible with the decision to build the Øresund Bridge. When it opened in 2000, the bridge initiated an integration process. Today, 72,000 people cross the bridge every day as commuters, shoppers, and tourists.

Cross-border cooperation was prepared before the bridge opened. The Øresund Committee was established in 1993 by the mayors of Malmö and Copenhagen, and used Interreg to support integration. Several hundreds of projects have been carried out in the areas of leisure and sports, education and culture. The paper concentrates on two major initiatives, the development of an industrial life science cluster and the development of the Øresund science region.

Medicon Valley is a European life science cluster that spans the extended cross-border region of Øresund. It started as an EU funded Interreg project in 1996, but after three years it continued without funding. Today, it has almost 300 members that represent the full life science value chain in Medicon Valley. Although Medicon Valley developed out of already existing biotech firms in the region, the major drivers have developed or attracted suppliers, produced spin-off companies, and established R&D units and promoted cooperation with research institutions.

The Øresund University was established as an umbrella organization for cooperation between 14 full faculty universities, specialized universities, and university colleges in the cross-border region. Together, the participating institutions host 165,000 students, 6,000 PhD students, and 10,000 researchers.

The cross-border university and regional scientific cooperation has been evaluated by OECD, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development with a successful outcome.

One of the results of university cooperation, the web portal Oresund.org – promoted under the label Øresund Campus – has the aim of enhancing free study mobility for students in the region.

The paper concludes that although there is evidence that the Øresund Bridge and cross-border cooperation have knitted the region more closely together, it is still too early to conclude that the increased interaction across the border has contributed to the development of a common identity. Much has been accomplished, but there is still some way to go before the differences created by the border can be reconciled.

## **Red Sludge Spill in Ajka, Hungary in 2010: Disputes on the Dual Criteria of Waste Management between the EU and Hungary**

IEDA Osamu

The oil spill accident in the Gulf of Mexico might be remembered worldwide as the most serious environmental accident of 2010. In contrast, the red sludge spill in Ajka, a small town in western Hungary, almost went unnoticed in the international mass media. The physical magnitude was, however, similar in both catastrophes: 800,000 m<sup>3</sup> of oil mud spewed out for three months, and eleven people were killed in the Gulf of Mexico; in Ajka, at least, 700,000 m<sup>3</sup> of red sludge,

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hazardous waste from the alumina industry, ran over the wall of the waste reservoir, and ten people were killed. Locally the red sludge spill caused long term damages on the environment and the society, as well. Beyond its long-lasting recovery and compensation process, the accident in Ajka became a hot international issue in the European arena beyond the Hungarian borders, when the CEO of the Hungarian alumina company, which was responsible for the spill accident, said that the red sludge was not hazardous according to the EU criteria in spite of the huge damages already caused by the red sludge flood.

A majority of the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe became member states of the EU in 2004 and 2007, accepting the *Aquires Communotaire*, the European standards and conditions in almost all fields of life, according to which member states and its peoples have to follow. The *Aquires* include many legal norms relating to environmental policy, though the East European countries required a moratorium on the implementation of some *Aquires* concerning environmental policy, when they gained full-membership in 2004 and 2007. Thus we may expect that the EU should have much more severe criteria in the field of environment than the East European countries. The Ajka accident, however, shows that in reality this is not always the case, and the above mentioned CEO's comment provides good evidence for this case. Eventually, in 2000, Hungary had already established an act on waste management, which was very comprehensive and strict enough to qualify the red sludge as hazardous. What made the situation complicated is the Hungary's EU membership in 2004, when Hungary accepted the EU norms of waste management, as well as other norms.

Hungarian specialists, including academics, at last after heated discussions, concluded that the red sludge was indeed hazardous in spite of EU norms, based on the Hungarian act of 2000. The Hungarian government, the Orban's Fidesz cabinet, accepted this conclusion, and Fidesz representatives raised the issue with the EU Parliament.

The Ajka accident thus developed from a local issue to a European one, and potentially suggests the issue will become a global one, because the red sludge has been one of the most serious issues in the ratification process for the new London Convention on the dumping of waste at sea. Japan is one of the parties insisting that red sludge is not hazardous. The red sludge issue is all the more pertinent for Japan, because the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Energy and Environment, which counts Japan as a member, has so far qualified red sludge as dangerous.

The paper examines these topics, and proposes some further issues concerning the future management of red sludge.

## Seeker after the Promised Land: Apolinary Hartglas, 1883-1953

MIYAZAKI Haruka

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, people have tried to restore their identity in the former Eastern Europe. History is one of the largest and richest sources of materials for the reconstruction of identity. This is why a considerable number of studies have been conducted on national history during the past twenty years. A biography of Iwan Franco, written by Jarosław Hrycak, is a recent example.

Hrycak's work explored identity from a micro-historical point of view. But at the same time, Hrycak tried to show the history of Ukraine as a history of a multi-cultural region (Galicja) through the eyes of Iwan Franko. Maybe this is why his monograph is so popular and at the same time so controversial. From the life of only one person, we can make hundreds of identity models: from a stereotypical view, to a fresh interpretation.

However, in most cases, biographies of "national heroes" are easily connected to so-called national history narratives. In the "national history" narratives, generally, identity has been recognized as something constant. On the other hand, relatively little attention has been given to the processes of creating national identity. Adam Michnik pointed out this problem in the preface of Hrycak's monograph. According to Michnik, we normally believe that Iwan Franco was an Ukrainian nationalist. However, this was only a small part of his life. Actually, Franco was active as an Ukrainian nationalist only in the second part of his life, so people could call him a socialist, a feminist, or even an atheist. Of course, it depends on the period. However, in most cases, his whole life has been described as the life of a nationalist.

We find a similar situation in Polish historiography. Especially in the nineteenth century, political activists frequently changed their ideology or membership – we know a lot about such things. Even so, when we talk about them, we tend to describe the person in question as a socialist or a nationalist or a Zionist from Poland, and so on. By simplifying a person's identity, we may overlook some important details of their life and thoughts.

This paper adopts a micro-historical approach. This biographical research tries to examine one of the processes of creating identities. The purpose of this paper is to show how national identity is unstable and changeable. Here I focus on one person, Apolinary Hartglas, who was known as

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a Zionist from Poland at the beginning of the twentieth century. You will find not only his Polish identity, but also other possibilities in his life.

Hartglas was active in Poland from the end of the nineteenth century up to the Second World War (1904-39). He was known as a lawyer, as an assemblyman, and also as a Zionist in the interwar period. However, Hartglas's Zionism was different from the so-called mainstream Zionism. During the ten years before the First World War, mainstream Polish Zionists emigrated from Poland to Palestine. David Ben-Gurion, the future prime minister of Israel, was among them. This migration wave is called the "Second Aliyah." It is said that about thirty to forty thousand people emigrated during the "Second Aliyah." However, Hartglas decided to remain in Poland.

According to his Zionism, the final cause was to build a Jewish state in Palestine. On the other hand, he put a premium on life in the diaspora. At least for Hartglas, diaspora was a synonym for life in Poland. In this respect, his Zionism was no ordinary Zionism. In 1906, he published a brochure entitled *Terytorium a naród* (Territory and Nation). Here we can find the basic structure of the future vision for Poland, for his "Promised Land." By doing so, we may find examples of anti-stereotypical national identity and counter-examples to the "national history" narratives.